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ABSTRACT. In his rich and stimulating book, Blake argues (among other things)
that comprehensive coercion triggers egalitarian obligations of distributive justice.
I argue that (1) coercion is not a necessary condition for egalitarian justice to apply;
(2) Blake’s use of a moralised conception of coercion is a mistake; (3) coercion is a
redundant member of any set of sufficient conditions that might explain why
distributive justice applies; (4) Blake’s emphasis on providing conditions for the
exercise of autonomy might support a much more cosmopolitan theory of dis-
tributive justice.
A basic commitment to the autonomy of all human beings is at the
heart of Justice and Foreign Policy. Blake here draws on Raz rather
than Kant. In this picture, autonomy is a value realized when three
conditions have been satisfied. First, the autonomous have a range of
mental capacities sufficient to exercise judgment and choice in the
light of reasons. Second, they must have an adequate range of op-
tions from which to choose. And third, the autonomous must live
independently, free from the domination of others; they must live in
accordance with their own view about how that life should be lived.
When these three conditions are satisfied, a person can rightly
consider herself to be a (partial) author of her life.1
But Blake’s book is not about autonomy. He wants to take the
value of autonomy as a given, as something that any liberal has
reason to endorse without taking a definitive view about its deeper
philosophical grounds. Instead, Blake’s attention is on the implica-
tions of our commitment to autonomy for our understanding of the
1 One can only be a partial author because no one can be fully independent of others, or have an
infinite range of options, or unlimited mental capacities.
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content, grounds, and scope of both international toleration and
distributive justice. In this response, I will focus on the latter. In
short, Blake argues that obligations of distributive justice towards
others can emerge in one of two ways. First, they can emerge from a
general duty to secure a minimal level of autonomous functioning
for all human beings. This, Blake argues, gives us strong reasons to
pursue foreign policies that leave no human being with less than is
required for minimal autonomous functioning. Given the circum-
stances of our world, including its division into a world of states, this
requires us to support the emergence of democracy in non-demo-
cratic states (while being wary of how much we can actually change,
especially via misguided military action), to support states that do
not have the capacity to sustain minimal autonomous functioning
for their citizens, and not to undermine democracy abroad where it
has been already established. Second, more demanding obligations of
distributive justice – and here Blake means egalitarian justice along
the lines of Rawls’s second principle – emerge, Blake claims, only in
the context of the comprehensive coercion typical of the modern
state. The idea, roughly, is that such comprehensive coercion
threatens to undermine our autonomy in a way that coercion at the
international level does not. International coercion is aimed, for
example, primarily at states, and there is no authority internationally
that can actively coerce individuals without the mediation of states.
Because of this threat to our autonomy, the state therefore owes us a
special justification for the way it organizes public and private law
that the international order does not. This special justification, in
turn, requires the state to secure a broadly egalitarian distribution of
prospects, since it must show us that those worse off in the
scheme could be no better off in any alternative scheme.
This is a rich work that bears much more reflection than I can
give it here. There is much with which I agree. For example, I think
the arguments for why liberal democratic states have no good reason
not to encourage liberal democracy abroad are important, and bear
much closer scrutiny. It is a mistake to think that a theory that does
not shy away from this conclusion must be committed to crusading
policies to intervene militarily in other countries, or to override or
disrespect the voices of those who disagree. Quite on the contrary, a
ANDREA SANGIOVANNI272
liberalism that takes seriously its own commitment to democratic
freedom and equality must also take seriously the oppression and
resistance of all those around the world whose freedom and equality
is not recognized by their own governments. This has important
implications, which I cannot explore here, particularly for our atti-
tudes towards the treatment of women in many non-liberal states (as
well as in liberal ones!). Blake’s critique of Rawls’s Law of Peoples is
also particularly rewarding, as is the idea that an adequate concep-
tion of justice must be sensitive to the contexts in which justice
becomes, as it were, a problem. A conception of justice should be,
Blake convincingly argues, a response to the injustice we find our-
selves faced with us here and now. While more idealizing concep-
tions of justice – which, for example, try to imagine away our
current political world, and try to imagine a world made, as it were,
from scratch – are certainly legitimate, this is not the project that
Blake wants or claims to engage in. This is not because his con-
ception of justice is a form of non-ideal theorizing, but because this is
what ideal theory, correctly understood, itself requires. Indeed, along
with Laura Valentini’s Justice in a Globalized World, I believe that
Justice and Foreign Policy is the most powerful recent statement of a
coercion-based view.2
In this paper, I will focus on those aspects of Blake’s argument
with which I find myself less in agreement. In particular, I want to
focus on Blake’s emphasis on coercion, and query whether his
commitment to autonomy really can justify such a narrow focus. My
response is divided in four sections, covering four independent, but
related, objections. My main conclusion is that coercion cannot be a
ground for distributive obligations. If we have distributive obliga-
tions towards others, they must be grounded independently.
I
For Blake, comprehensive coercion is a necessary condition for the
application of egalitarian norms. Comprehensive coercion involves
threats, directed to individuals, issued by public authorities, and
2 See also M. Risse, On Global Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), though it is not
clear what role coercion actually still plays in the view, given the emphasis on reciprocity as also a
ground of egalitarian justice. Cf. M. Risse, ‘What to Say About the State’, Social Theory and Practice 32
(2006): 671–698, which holds that comprehensive, direct, and immediate coercion is the sole ground of
egalitarian justice.
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aimed at ensuring compliance with those legal norms covering the
domains typically associated with a fully fledged legal system (most
significantly, criminal law and all laws touching on the distribution of
individual property holdings).3 In a previous article, I argued that
such coercion could not be a necessary condition. I gave an example
to which Blake responds in the book. Here is the example:
Imagine an internally just state. Let us now suppose that all local means of law
enforcement – police, army, and any potential replacements – are temporarily
disarmed and disabled by a terrorist attack. Suppose further that this condition
continues for several years. Crime rates increase, compliance with the laws de-
creases, but society does not dissolve at a stroke into a war of all against all.
Citizens generally feel a sense of solidarity in the wake of the attack, and a desire
to maintain public order and decency despite the private advantages they could
gain through disobedience and noncompliance; this sense of solidarity is common
knowledge and sufficient to provide assurance that people will (generally) con-
tinue to comply with the law. The laws still earn most people’s respect: the state
continues to provide the services it always has; the legislature meets regularly;
laws are debated and passed; contracts and wills drawn up; property transferred in
accordance with law; disputes settled through legal arbitration, and so on.4
The example is meant to trigger our judgment that norms of
distributive justice would still apply, even though people are not
coerced into compliance.5 Blake responds in two ways. First, he
claims that the thought experiment can’t work because the situation
described is unlikely ever to be realized in practice. This response
seems weak. The point of the example isn’t to describe an empirical
possibility, but to describe a case in which we hold constant
everything but the presence of coercion. All of Blake’s own cases
involving Borduria and Sylvania (of which there are 16) involve
hypothetical cases in which we are asked to imagine mere
possibilities. I don’t see how the empirical likelihood that any of
these cases might be actualized in the world as we know it is
relevant. And, in any case, I don’t find the case, as described,
particularly hard to imagine. After all, most compliance with current
legal systems – say in the U.S. – occurs not because people are
3 See, e.g., p. 83.
4 A. Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2007):
2–39.
5 I go on, in the original paper, to describe how implausible it would be to bite the bullet and claim
that in this case norms of distributive justice would no longer apply. Could the rich in the society stop
paying their taxes simply because police enforcement has stopped, especially once we assume that
everyone else in the society continues to pay?
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responding to the threat of being punished, but because, for a variety
of reasons, they find the norms either sufficiently authoritative, or
find that non-compliance would be wrong for other reasons (e.g.,
because, say, murder or stealing is wrong, or out of a sense of fair
play – when contemplating, say, cheating on their taxes – or simply
out of habit).6 Indeed, no legal system could survive if individuals
sought to disobey whenever they could get away with it for some
personal gain; no amount of police or surveillance would be
sufficient to prevent breakdown. The case of the post-attack society
just asks us to generalize such patterns of compliance, and to assume
that sufficient assurance could be achieved through some other
means (such as common knowledge regarding the prevalence of
such law-abiding dispositions).
The second strategy of response is more promising. Blake grants
that egalitarian norms would still apply in the post-attack society, but
argues that the example only works to trigger the judgment because
there is a more subtle form of coercion at work – a form of coercion
which, in turn, is sufficient to generate the very same demands of
justice as more typical forms of state coercion (viz. those involving
the threat of punishment and police enforcement). The form of
coercion Blake has in mind is the threat of exclusion from the pro-
tection of the legal system, and hence the threat of being returned to
the state of nature.7 This (implicit) threat, Blake argues, still infringes
the autonomy of those in the society, and so still must be justified in
the same way.
But the example can be clarified in a way that makes it evident
that no such threat is required to maintain the force of the example.
In the original example, I asked the reader to imagine that a small
group of rich people (impressed by Blake’s argument) had initiated a
movement to eliminate steeply progressive taxes. They claimed that
there was no longer any coercive enforcement of the law, so they
were no longer under an obligation to pay the high taxes required to
maintain an egalitarian distribution of shares. It was important here
that they were not arguing that they were no longer obligated to pay
because, without the coercion, others could not be trusted to pay
their fair share. Ex hypothesi, they agreed and accepted that others
6 See, e.g., T. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
7 p. 122ff.
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would continue to pay their taxes (foolishly in their estimation).
Rather, their argument was Blake’s: comprehensive coercion triggers
a special demand for distributive egalitarianism because of the way it
infringes autonomy, independently of its further downstream effects.
The rich group’s argument, I argued, was wrongheaded: why should
the presence or absence of legally authorized coercion in a just
society determine what we owe to others at the bar of justice? Isn’t it
sufficient that everyone complies with the law (and that such com-
pliance is common knowledge)? Recall, nothing in this society
changes except the state’s ability to coerce those on its territory.
Blake writes that this argument only works because we assume
(implicitly) that if citizens do not comply with the laws, they will be
‘returned to the state of nature’. I interpret Blake here to mean that
were citizens to violate the laws, they would be ostracized or face
being otherwise stripped of the rights and privileges of citizens. But I
don’t see why this further assumption is necessary. Suppose, for
example, that it is well known that should anyone stop paying the
taxes mandated by extant legislation, nothing would happen to
them.8 They would still have all the rights and privileges of citizens;
the society has given up on the attempt to punish or penalize non-
compliers (though it still expects and calls for their compliance as a
matter of law). And imagine that the rich, along with everyone else,
still comply with the law out of a sense of solidarity and fair play.
I don’t see why the mere possibility of violating the law without
suffering any sanction ought to change our judgment about the
justice of the egalitarian scheme. Again, everything is as before: laws
passed, taxes collected and resources redistributed, jobs completed,
and so on. Why should the mere fact that people are no longer
coerced make any difference to our claims on a fair share of the
social product?
The objector might make one last try: ‘Yes, but there is still a
form of autonomy-infringing coercion in this case, namely ‘social
8 We could go even further: Suppose that the poor in the post-attack society could emigrate to other
states in which they could receive no worse treatment than they would get under the rich group’s
proposed reforms, and assume that the poor would rather not do so. Would that possibility render the
rich group’s claim to undo the egalitarianism of the current system any more plausible? Could the rich
group plausibly claim to the poor, after they had enacted their anti-egalitarian reforms: ‘love it or leave
it’? Or: ‘If you decide to stay here, you now do so voluntarily (given the possibility of emigrating), and
so we no longer have any obligations to you to maintain an egalitarian scheme’? I say more about cases
like this in A. Sangiovanni, ‘The Irrelevance of Coercion, Imposition, and Framing to Distribution
Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 79–110, including what I call the ‘spurious role of consent’.
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pressure’: should anyone fail to obey the law, others would com-
plain; such complaints are unpleasant, and so there is still a ‘penalty’
attached to non-compliance’. I hope it is clear that this response
would give away the game. Social pressure is only plausibly seen to
constitute a form of autonomy-infringing coercion when it either
serves to encourage actions that are morally wrong or when the
amount of social pressure applied is disproportionate. Social pressure
on wives to be subservient to their husbands, for example, is plau-
sibly seen as autonomy-infringing coercion because it encourages
and reinforces the subordination of women. But when social pres-
sure is proportionate and serves to reinforce genuine moral obliga-
tions, it is implausible to say that such pressure constitutes
autonomy-infringing coercion. Social pressure that functions to
support norms against murder, lying, or cheating, for example, is not
plausibly seen as autonomy-infringing coercion (or even pro tanto
morally wrong), precisely because it (proportionately) discourages
morally wrongful conduct.9 This puts our objector on the horns of a
dilemma: if he accepts that social pressure in favor of laws sup-
porting egalitarian norms in our post-attack society are proportion-
ate and do not encourage wrongful conduct, then he must abandon
the claim that such social pressure would constitute a form of
autonomy-infringing coercion. If, on the other horn, he argues that
social pressure in favor of laws supporting egalitarian norms in our
post-attack society is either disproportionate or does encourage mo-
rally wrongful conduct (because egalitarian norms no longer apply),
then he has squarely begged the question. For the argument to go
through, we must be able to identify instances of autonomy-in-
fringing coercion first, and then, in virtue of that fact, conclude that
egalitarianism therefore applies. But if identifying the presence of
autonomy-infringing coercion itself depends on whether egalitari-
anism applies or not, then we are nowhere. I conclude that Blake’s
(and the further objector’s) response to the counter-example fails.
9 Indeed, many, like J. S. Mill, would say that it is criterial for something to be a moral wrong that it
merit censure of some kind. Cf. also J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986),
p. 381 from whom Blake draws his conception of autonomy: ‘Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in
pursuit of the good. The ideal of autonomy requires only the availability of morally acceptable options’.
For Raz, removing the option to, for example, lie or cheat or kill therefore does not constitute an
infringement of our autonomy. And if removing the option does not count as an infringement, then why
should merely making it less appealing (as social pressure does)?
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II
In this section, I want to raise a related, but more general, problem
regarding Blake’s conception of coercion. At a crucial point in the
book, Blake discusses the possibility of coercion among states. He
wonders under what conditions hard bargaining between a richer
and a poorer state (that is not, in Rawls’s terms, ‘burdened’) con-
stitutes coercion.10 This is an important point to clarify for Blake
because the extension of his coercion-based account to the interna-
tional realm depends on it. If there is objectionable coercion in cases
of this kind, then states would have a special obligation to com-
pensate or otherwise rectify the consequent infringement of the
subjugated state’s citizens. While this may not be as thoroughgoing a
set of obligations as those incurred at the domestic level (depending
on how we ultimately characterize the coercion), they would still be
significant. So, given the absence of systemic police enforcement or
individual punishment at the international level,11 we need to know
when pressure or influence counts as coercive (and hence as
objectionably autonomy-infringing). Blake notes that the solution
turns on whether a particular proposal12 – such as, for example, ‘we,
A, will continue to trade with you, B, only if you allow our military
forces access to your bases when operating in foreign theaters’ – is an
offer or a threat. Answering this further question, in turn, requires
determining what baseline should be used in judging whether B has
been relevantly harmed or benefitted by the proposal. Should we, for
example, use how well off B was before the proposal as a baseline?
How well off B would be in the normal, expected course of events
without the proposal (given what we know about situations of this
kind)?13 Or how well off B morally ought to be? For reasons first
10 p. 119.
11 Blake notes the exception, namely international criminal law.
12 Or, we might add, whether the influence or pressure exerted by a particular set of proposals to
which the existence of an institution or regime gives rise counts as coercive.
13 For example, does it matter whether A was planning to stop trading with B for independent
reasons before they made the proposition?
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adduced by Nozick, Blake sides with the last option.14 Blake’s ac-
count of coercion is therefore moralized: one counts as having been
coerced only when the proposal would leave one worse off than one
morally ought to be. In the example just given, A would thus count
as coercing B only if A had a prior moral obligation to trade with B.
This serves Blake well because it allows him to deploy his account of
a state’s foreign obligations – which are, as I mentioned above, based
on a general duty to maintain basic conditions for autonomous
flourishing – to determine whether particular international transac-
tions count as coercive or not. On Blake’s moralized view, a par-
ticular international transaction or institution counts as coercive only
when it can be shown to undermine the basic capacity for autono-
mous flourishing of those affected by transaction or institution. If
Blake is right, this not only simplifies the task of assessing the justice
of foreign policy but also blocks off an important and common line
of objection, namely that international coercion is so profound and
pervasive that it fundamentally infringes the autonomy of citizens
the world round (which would entail that egalitarian obligations
would be global in reach).
Adopting a moralized view of this kind comes, however, at a cost.
While it may help to clarify when international transactions and
institutions are plausibly seen as coercive, it undermines his domestic
account. Recall that Blake’s paradigmatic example of comprehensive
state coercion is criminal law.15 But suppose a state’s criminal law
penalizes only morally wrong acts, and suppose further that sen-
tencing judgments are fully proportionate, and punishment is
administered fairly. If that is the case, then, on a moralized view, the
state does not coerce you when it threatens to throw you in jail if
you commit murder.16 Because you lack a right not to be imprisoned
in such circumstances, you are made no worse off than you morally
ought to be. And if that is true of the criminal law, then it is also true
14 R. Nozick, ‘Coercion’, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, eds. S.
Morgenbesser et al. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), pp. 440–472, though it is important to note
that Nozick’s own view is not fully moralized. He claims, instead, that we ought to use a moral baseline
only when the ‘normal, expected course of events’ and the moral baseline diverge. Otherwise, the
former is the governing baseline. I’m not sure whether Blake adopts Nozick’s final view, or a more
straightforwardly moralized one. For more on this, see A. Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice and the Morality
of Coercion, Imposition, and Framing’, in Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives, eds. M. Ronzoni et al. (London: Routledge, 2011).
15 See p. 86ff.
16 For this point, see also Nozick, ‘Coercion’; W. Edmundson, ‘Is Law Coercive?’, Legal Theory 1
(1995): 81–111.
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of any just law, including just tax and property law. Take laws
proscribing tax evasion, for example. Let us imagine that the tax
system is just overall, and that the laws declare that anyone caught in
violation of such laws will either have to pay a (proportionate) fine
or be subject to (proportionate) criminal penalties. Because (ex
hypothesi) the tax system is just, and the fines and penalties propor-
tionate, no one who either complies with the law or who is caught
and punished or fined for evading taxes is morally worse off than
they ought to be. And if no one is morally worse off than they ought
to be, then, according to a moralized account, they have not been
coerced. This is a serious problem for Blake’s view for two reasons.
First, as with the social pressure objection, it looks as if, on this view,
we need to know whether we have egalitarian obligations before we
can identify whether a particular tax system is coercive in the first
place, which would straightforwardly undermine Blake’s claim that
coercion is an independent ground of egalitarian justice. Second, it
looks like the view would have the absurd consequence that egali-
tarianism was required in all but the most just states (whose laws
could not, on a moralized view, count as coercive).
Blake is alive to this worry, and, in a footnote, he writes:
My response, I think, is to point out that much of the law involves restrictions on
actions that are not malum in se – much of what we do through law is to define
who shall hold what entitlements, rather than simply to prevent force or fraud.
(120fn10)
Blake is here referring to the distinction between moral wrongs that
are malum in se (morally wrong in themselves, i.e., independently of
any legal regulation) and those that are malum prohibitum (wrong
because they are prohibited, i.e., morally wrong only because a law
has proscribed them). Blake’s thought appears to be that adopting a
moralized view of coercion is not a problem because only laws that
legitimately regulate mala in se come out as not coercive on such a
view (but then what of most criminal law?). On the other hand, laws
that legitimately create mala prohibita – such as, for example, tax,
traffic, and most property law – can still be viewed as coercive
because they regulate areas in which there are no (pre-existing)
moral wrongs. If this is right, then the state still has a job to do in
providing a special, more demanding justification to those subject to
laws governing areas that are mala prohibita – and therefore, most
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importantly, a special justification for the distribution of property
entitlements. The problem is that Blake never explains why the
distinction between mala prohibita and mala in se should matter in
determining the moral baseline for identifying instances of coercion.
In both cases, there are moral wrongs; in both cases, threats are
issued which come with penalties. Why the difference?
Perhaps the idea is that, in the case of actions that are mala pro-
hibita, citizens have, by definition, ‘pre-existing’ moral permissions that
the law then proscribes. So when the state changes our normative
situation by prohibiting such previously permissible actions, it owes us
a special justification for doing so that it wouldn’t owe us had we
never had the permissions in the first place. The intuition here seems
to trade on the fact that the law’s prohibition harms us by setting back
our interests in doing whatever it is that was morally permitted before
the law settled the case; the harm is key in explaining both why the
prohibition is coercive, and hence why it is pro tanto wrong.
But what are the morally permissible actions that the state now
makes it impossible for us to act on? In what sense, exactly, does the
state harm us when it passes (just) laws? The trouble is that, espe-
cially with regard to property and tax law, it is not clear that we have
morally relevant ‘pre-existing’ moral entitlements with respect to
any particular bit of property or income that are thwarted by the
(just) state’s laws in that area. The laws create property entitlements –
including entitlements to income – that would not have existed in
the absence of the law.17 If this is correct, then the only moral
permissions that we must give up in a fully fledged legal system are
our general moral permission to acquire property in a state of nature
(by, say, mixing our labor with it) and our general permission to
roam the territory unhindered by property restrictions. The key
question is: In what sense does the state harm us when it legislates in
such a way as to make what was previously permissible impermis-
sible? The moralized view of coercion says that we need to take
moralized view of the baseline in determining whether we have
been harmed.18 So we should ask: Does the state leave us worse off
17 Blake appears to agree at p. 94; but cf. p. 92.
18 Notice that if we take a non-moralized view, then only a radical anarchist would be able to argue
that we were better off before the just state started making laws. But Blake argues that we have a moral
obligation (rather than merely a permission) to create coercive institutions, precisely because of their
good effects on autonomous flourishing, so the anarchist position is unavailable to him anyway.
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than we morally ought to be when it begins passing (just) laws? The
answer must be no. For recall that Blake argues (among his four
basic principles), that we have a moral obligation to set up coercive
institutions precisely because such institutions are required to make
autonomous lives possible. This entails that while we have moral
permissions in the state of nature, we don’t have any moral immunities
to being coerced by just states. So by passing laws, and changing our
moral permissions, the just state does not harm us in any relevant
moralized sense. If that is right, then, once again, the just state
cannot be understood to coerce us when legislating the mala pro-
hibita. The distinction between mala prohibita and mala in se cannot
be used, I conclude, to answer the objection.
One might wonder whether Blake has in mind a more libertarian
view, according to which, for example, our pre-tax income or
property is considered to be ours, and taxation is considered as a
taking, in which what is ours is given to someone else. On this view,
taxation would be coercive, even on a moralized view. This is be-
cause it would constitute a pro tanto violation of our pre-tax enti-
tlements. At one point, Blake writes:
The law of taxation is clearly coercive. Federal income taxation plainly involves
the taking away of previously earned resources from individuals. As above, this
form of law seems properly regarded as a putative violation of the liberal principle
of autonomy – it gives us, in essence, a choice between surrendering our good or
our lives…. [S]uch taxation is presumptively wrong until justified through the
giving of reasons which could not be reasonably rejected by those who face the
taxation. (92)
But in what sense do we have any entitlement to what we earn
before taxes, such that the tax counts as taking something that is
already rightfully ours rather than simply defining what is to be
rightfully ours in the first place? For the argument to go through,
some form of libertarianism is required to get the pro tanto
wrongness of any tax law going.19 But if such libertarianism is
required, then it looks unlikely that any kind of egalitarianism could
be justified, except as a way of rectifying past wrongs in transfer or
acquisition. Given the existence of such strong rights to pre-tax
19 It is important to emphasize that only the right-libertarian takes this view. According to left-
libertarians such as, for example, Mike Otsuka or Hillel Steiner, property that we attain through the
operation of the market is not legitimately ours until everyone’s claims to a fair share of natural
resources (or their equivalent monetary or welfarist value) have been satisfied.
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income, why wouldn’t the conclusion simply be that redistributive
taxation is a form of slavery?
The general view of property on which Blake seems to rely strikes
me as implausible for similar reasons as those adduced by Murphy
and Nagel:
We are all born into an elaborately structured legal system governing the acqui-
sition, exchange, and transmission of property rights, and ownership comes to
seem the most natural thing in the world. But the modern economy in which
we earn our salaries, own our homes, bank accounts, retirement savings, and
personal possessions, and in which we can use our resources to consume or in-
vest, would be impossible without the framework provided by government sup-
ported by taxes. This doesn’t mean that taxes are beyond evaluation – only that
the target of evaluation must be the system of property rights that they make
possible. We cannot start by taking as given…. some initial allocation of posses-
sions – what people originally own, what is theirs, prior to government interfer-
ence.20
But the ‘everyday libertarianism’ rejected by Murphy and Nagel
cannot be Blake’s view. He does not hold the implausible view that
somehow redistribution is justified as a kind of compensation for the
violation of pre-existing property rights.21 After all, if we did have
prior rights to pre-tax income and property, then the state would
owe the rich more than the poor, since it takes more from the rich
than from the poor. I conclude that Blake’s adoption of a moralized
view is a mistake.
III
In the first section, I argued that comprehensive coercion is not
necessary. In the second section, I argued that it was a mistake for
Blake to adopt a moralized view of coercion. At this point, we might
wonder two things. First, we might wonder whether there is any
deeper reason to endorse the intuitions governing our response to
the post-attack counterexample. Why can’t Blake just bite the bullet
in that case, and say that the group of rich people envisaged in the
20 L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 8. A
conclusion with which Blake seems to agree at p. 94.
21 Blake writes: ‘These laws define, collectively, what sorts of entitlements exist in our society; they
determine what shall count as property, what sorts of private agreements will receive public
enforcement, and – in the law of taxation – what sorts of otherwise private resources must be turned
over for public purposes. This pattern of laws, then, defines how we may hold, transfer, and enjoy our
property and our entitlements. In so doing, I think, these laws create a pattern of entitlements…’ (94).
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counterexample has a point? Second, we might wonder whether
Blake could abandon both the claim that coercion is moralized and
the claim that coercion is necessary. That is, can Blake argue that
non-moralized coercion is only a sufficient condition for distributive
justice?22
In this section, drawing on previous work, I will argue that
coercion (whether or not we take a moralized view) cannot be a
sufficient condition for egalitarian obligations to apply. In brief, I will
contend that we have no reason to believe that coercion can explain
either the content or the scope of our distributive obligations. Such
obligations must be grounded independently. If I am right, then this
helps to explain our intuitions in the post-attack counter-example:
we react the way we do to the counter-example because we rightly
assume that egalitarianism, if it applies, must apply for reasons that
have nothing to do with the presence (or absence) of coercion.
Here is a schematic summary of Blake’s argument (here taken as a
sufficient condition which is neutral between moralized and non-
moralized views):
(1) Coercion is pro tanto wrong (because it violates autonomy).
(2) Those whose will have been coerced are therefore owed a special,
more stringent justification for the coercion.
(3) Basic social and political institutions massively coerce subjects by
enforcing a vast array of legal rules that shape the full extent of their
life and liberty, including how they may acquire, transfer, and so on,
property.
(4) Those forced to live by this pattern of rules are therefore owed a
special, more stringent justification for the resulting distribution than
those who are not.
(5) This special, more stringent justification, to be successful, requires the
pattern of rules to realize a more demanding set of socioeconomic
standards (e.g., egalitarian standards) among those have been coerced.
The key to the view is to explain how (5) follows from (4). When
Blake, for example, writes that comprehensive coercion is justified
only if no alternative feasible scheme could make the worst-off
22 I here leave aside the other changes that Blake’s theory would need to make in order to
accommodate this revision. Notice, for example, that if coercion were merely a sufficient condition,
then Blake couldn’t exclude other ways in which egalitarianism might be generated at the international
level.
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among the coerced any better off, we should wonder: Why would it
be unreasonable to reject a set of distributive principles that is
limited in scope only to those coerced? And why must the
justification take the specific form of the difference principle (or
other similarly egalitarian standard)?
There are, I believe, two intuitively plausible answers that might
help in explaining the jump from (4) to (5). On one variant, (5)
follows from (4) because more demanding norms of distributive
justice are understood as outweighing the initial wrong; on another
variant, such standards are understood as compensating for the initial
wrong. According to the Compensation variant, by coercing you,
I infringe your right to autonomy, and hence I owe you special
compensation for the wrong – a compensation paid in the currency
of more demanding socioeconomic standards.23 You have no reason
to complain about being made in one sense worse off (by being
coerced) because, all things considered, the more demanding dis-
tributive standard makes you much better off overall. According to
the Outweighing variant, my infringement of your right to autonomy
is not compensated but outweighed (without ‘moral residue’) by the
urgency or weightiness of the general interests protected by the
more demanding distributive standard.
In Blake’s 2001 article, it was unclear which variant Blake adop-
ted. In his book, he also doesn’t explicitly come down in favor of one
or the other, but, at least at one point, he seems to adopt
Outweighing. He writes: ‘[A]ppropriate conditions of hypothetical
consent [model the way in] which the moral harm of coercion might
be nullified’ (96). In the following, I will therefore assume the
Outweighing reading of the argument. In previous work, I have
argued at greater length that this interpretation cannot work.24 In
this section, I provide a foreshortened version of that discussion, and
explore its implications for justice in foreign policy in the next.
23 The structure of the view is similar to discussions of ‘moral residue’ in the theory of rights. Many
believe that when I break into your log cabin to protect myself from a storm, I infringe your property
right, and hence owe you compensation as a result. See, e.g., J. Feinberg, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the
Inalienable Right to Life’, Philosophy and public affairs 7 (1978): 93–123; J. Thomson, ‘Rights and
Compensation’, Noûs 14 (1980): 3–15. In tort law, such scenarios are equivalent to what Coleman calls
‘infringement’ or ‘takings’ cases, in which fully justifiable conduct can still produce wrongful losses (and
hence merit compensation). See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), pp. 244–249. See also notes 31 and 32.
24 See Sangiovanni, ‘The Irrelevance of Coercion, Imposition, and Framing to Distribution Justice’.
In that article, I argued that Compensation cannot work either.
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When someone has been coerced, Blake is right that we must
offer him a special justification for the coercion. But what form must
that special justification take? Suppose your son would like to bor-
row your car to go to a party with friends, but you are not sure
whether to give it to him. I offer you advice, suggesting that you
should; after all, he is a trustworthy and reliable young man. My
offering advice (whatever its content) is not something that requires
any special justification. At most, I may have an obligation to give
you sincere advice. But now suppose that instead of offering you
advice, I coerce you – for example, by threatening to break your arm –
in such a way as to ensure that you will give the car to your son,
whether you want to or not. Now suppose that I coerce you in an
effort to take possession of the car to rescue the lives of ten people
who are drowning. We believe that threatening to break your arm in
the latter case (where people are drowning) is justifiable, whereas in
the former it is not. How did we make up our minds?
The general form of an act of coercion is this: A coerces B to do
some action u in order to attain some end C. In wondering whether
the coercion is justified, we then ask: does B have a morally weighty
reason to u sufficient to outweigh or ‘nullify’ the wrong involved in
coercing her to u? To answer this question, Outweighing asks us to
tally up the moral weightiness of A’s interests in B’s u-ing, the moral
weightiness of B’s interests in not-u-ing, and the moral weightiness
of the interests significantly affected by the pursuit of end C. We
then see whether the net moral weightiness of the interests involved
on both sides of our ledger outweighs the moral weight of B’s
interest in not being coerced (however that interest is construed).25
To illustrate: The moral weight of my (A’s) interests in your giving
the car to your son (u) is (barring unusual circumstances) not very
strong. The moral weight of your son (and his friends’) interest in
driving the car (C), it also seems plausible to assume, is also not very
strong: at most, getting around will be more difficult. But your (B’s)
interest (your fear that he will get in an accident) in not giving the
car to your son (not-u-ing) is much more morally weighty, as is the
moral weightiness of your interest in not being coerced. Therefore,
25 See, e.g., J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vols. 1–4 (New York: Oxford University
Press. According to Feinberg, ‘Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justi-
fication…. [This presumption in liberty’s favor] transfer[s] the burden of argument to the shoulders of
the advocate of coercion who must, in particular instances, show that the standing case for liberty can
be overridden by even weightier reasons on the other side of the scale’ (1:9; see also Chap. 5).
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we conclude, it is unjustifiable for me to coerce you. It should be
clear that the same analysis can easily be used to demonstrate that
coercion is justifiable in the case of the ten drowning people.
But here’s the problem: the moral weightiness of A’s interests in
B’s u-ing, the moral weightiness of B’s interests in not-u-ing, and the
moral weightiness of the interests significantly affected by the pursuit
of end C can be identified without any reference to whether or not A
coerces B. They remain, that is, constant across both scenarios in
which coercion is present and those in which it is not. To be sure,
whether the course of action is ultimately justified hinges on whe-
ther B has been coerced or not. But the moral weight of B’s interest
in not being coerced serves as a counterweight only once the net
moral weightiness of the other interests has been determined. The
moral weights assigned to the various interests involved are there-
fore not a function of how, or even whether, the ends at stake are
attained by coercing B.
If this is right, then it means that coercion cannot bound the scope
or fill the content of our distributive obligations. This is because the
moral weightiness of our various interests in receiving a share of the
social product are determined independently of whether coercion is
the offing or not. To illustrate, consider that, just as in the case of the
car and the ten drowning people, we do not need to take into
account only the interests of the person or persons coerced. If the
coercive act serves morally weighty third-party interests, then those
can be used to justify the coercion all-things-considered. The inter-
ests of ten people in survival are, for example, very morally weighty,
and, ex hypothesi, certainly weighty enough to threaten you in order
to get use of your car. But if that is true, then, analogously, the fact
that only citizens have been coerced by domestic law does nothing
to narrow the range of interests that should be considered in justi-
fying any particular act of coercion. It is one thing to say that
coercion requires special justification, and another to say that it
justifies treating the coercion-independent interests of those coerced
differently than those not coerced. Blake’s view only succeeds by
eliding the distinction. Consider the following passage (which
reflects a common pattern in the literature): ‘We have to give all
individuals within the web of coercion [call it group X], including those
who do most poorly, reasons to consent to the principles grounding
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their situation by giving [group X] reasons they could not reasonably
reject – a process that will result in the material egalitarianism of the
form expressed in the difference principle, since justifying our
coercive scheme to those least favored by it will require that we
demonstrate that no alternative principle could have made them
[emphasis mine] any better off’ (95–96). But here we may wonder:
why should only the interests of group X be considered in justifying
the coercion of those in group X? Why wouldn’t it be sufficient to
say that those coerced, namely group X, have no reasonable objec-
tion to the coercion because the interests of others (in our case,
nonmembers) are sufficiently weighty? Why couldn’t we replace the
last, italicized ‘them’ with some other group, Y (rather than the
group X intended)? I do not see how appeal to some kind of
hypothetical consent eliminates that possibility.
Blake’s view must thus presuppose a prior set of entitlements (what
I have called ‘morally weighty interests’) rather than provide
grounds for a new one. They leave us, therefore, with no explana-
tion of how and why the morally relevant features of coercion fix the
content and scope of the obligations in question. At most, an inde-
pendently justified set of distributive obligations affects the kinds of
coercion that might be permissible in the circumstances, but no
moral features of the coercion itself explain which obligations apply
and why they only hold among those whose will has been bent.
Subjection to coercion must there be a redundant part of any set of
sufficient conditions which together grounds egalitarianism.
IV
In this section, I want to draw some implications of the arguments I
have made in Sections I–III for Blake’s overall account of justice in
foreign policy. Recall that Blake conceives of his view as working out
the consequences of his liberal commitment to four principles:
(1) All individuals have equal moral status in virtue of their capacity to act
as autonomous agents.
(2) All individuals have a right to those political institutions sufficient to
protect their equal rights as autonomous agents.
(3) All individuals have a right to have the coercive actions of such political
institutions justified to them as autonomous agents.
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(4) All individuals have a duty to support, defend, and create such political
institutions. (25)
Note that nothing I have said thus far puts into question any of these
principles. I have been happy to accept them for the sake of
argument. What I have tried to challenge is the inference from (3) to
a domestically constrained egalitarianism. Indeed, once we put that
connection in question, we might reasonably wonder: Given the
foundational emphasis on autonomy, why focus so narrowly on only
two ways in which our capacity for autonomous functioning can be
set back, namely via comprehensive coercion (as in Blake’s case for
domestic egalitarianism), and via policies that leave us with less than
some minimal threshold (as in Blake’s case for a just foreign policy)?
Our capacity for autonomy can be set back, after all, in all sorts of
ways, and to greater and lesser degrees. If our obligation to secure
conditions for autonomous flourishing is truly global (as Blake
avers), then, once we have broken the connection between coercion
and distributive justice, why not take a much more globalist view?
Why not say that we have an obligation, through whatever
institutional means are at our disposal, to secure conditions for the
autonomous functioning of every human being, wherever they live?
On this view, domestic as well as supra-, inter-, and cross-national
institutions and policies would simply be instruments for realizing
the autonomous functioning of every human being. Of course, much
more would need to be done to work out such a position. For
example, we would still need to define some distributive principle to
determine a principle for selecting among different feasible institu-
tional schemes or policies: should we select the feasible scheme or
policy that is ‘closest’ to a globally egalitarian pattern of autonomous
functioning (or alternatively, an egalitarian set of social relations)? Or
the one closest to a prioritarian solution? Or sufficientarian? And so
on. The important point is that on such a globalist position coercion
would be only one way in which autonomous functioning could be
set back. I will not pursue this proposal any further since I do not
think Blake would endorse it, and I also do not think it should be
endorsed for independent reasons. I mention it only to point out a
natural way in which one might develop the four principles Blake
begins with once we abandon the narrow focus on coercion.
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